Proposal to Fund Several Curve SubDAOs from the Community Fund


This proposal is to create multiple CRV vests from the Curve Community Fund to fund the following Curve subDAOs:

  • Curve Research | 10m CRV
  • Curve Risk | 5m CRV
  • Curve Analytics | 5m CRV
  • Dev Tools | 10m CRV

The vests will fund subDAOs for a period of 2 years from Q1 '24 until Q1 '26.


The responsibilities of each subDAO are described in the Specifications section. In general, each subDAO is composed of a core team with a long history working on Curve who will oversee and administrate an extended network of teams working within the same discipline. SubDAOs will fund their core operations and other teams and projects working within the Curve ecosystem. At times there may be a crossover between each subDAO’s area of focus, in which case multiple subDAOs may coordinate on funding and project management responsibilities. For example, Llama Risk, Curve Research, and Curve Monitor recently worked together to manage a project by Xenophon Labs, conducting research on predicting stablecoin depegs with deliverables being a research paper and API that could be integrated into a risk dashboard (see: arvix, github, tweet).

Each subDAO will receive a vest to a multisig composed of trusted individuals working in the respective discipline. Some of these subDAO teams already have a long history working on behalf of the DAO (Curve Research, Llama Risk, and Curve Monitor). The Dev Tools subDAO has been recently created, as seen in the announcement.

CRV will vest linearly over 365 days from the Community Fund, and the DAO retains the right to cancel the remainder of the vest at any point. In case not all funds have been used by Q1 '26, subDAOs agree to either return the remainder to the Curve community fund or roll the remaining funds over to a subsequent round, pending DAO approval.

Each subDAO is expected to ensure continued accountability to the DAO by being available for feedback and making appropriate transparency efforts. Details of subDAO operations, including expenditures, operations, and accomplishments, should be publicly shared on a quarterly basis.

Each subDAO is responsible for any legal wrapper they require to conduct their operations and handling the IP ownership for any product produced by the subDAO. Llama Risk legal counsel, Svetlin, is currently conducting comprehensive research into potential legal structures for subDAOs in several jurisdictions. This will cover U.S. legal structures, European legal structures, and offshore jurisdictions. The research will delve into the requirements, benefits, and drawbacks of each legal entity and will give an overview and comparison of different legal structures, addressing key aspects such as formation requirements, decision-making, liability and duties of members, and tax implications.


Over the years, we have recognized an apparent need for various departments to support the continued development of Curve. The current funding process for these groups involves proposing a scope of work to the Curve Grant Council to periodically secure budgets, usually on a quarterly or annual basis depending on the requested budget size. There are a couple of downsides to this approach: less direct oversight of subDAOs from the Curve DAO and less certainty about continued funding for the recipients of the grants.

This alternative approach would give subDAOs greater autonomy, not only to conduct their own internal operations but also to fund other projects related to their focus area. For instance, independent teams conducting Curve research could petition the Curve Research subDAO for funding their Curve-related project. The expectation is that teams coordinating in this way, within a particular discipline, are better suited to recognize value adds and produce valuable collaborations. Well-managed subDAOs should attract talent within the community and experience contributor growth.


Vests can be initiated by calling deploy_vesting_contract() to the Vesting Escrow Factory with a minimum duration of 365 days. The DAO can disable the vest by calling toggle_disable() on the deployed Simple Vesting Escrow contract during the vesting period.

Details about each proposed sub-DAO are below:

Curve Research

  • Budget: 10m CRV vested over 365 days for operations from Q1 '24 to Q1 '26.
  • 3-of-5 multisig: 0x2Ba80b37e0beF5c92A0C3cb780f8583372D773Ac
    • Naga - Curve Researcher
    • Chanho - Curve Researcher
    • Fiddy - Curve Team
    • PilotVietnam - Curve Team
    • Michael - Curve Founder
  • Team: The Curve Research subDAO currently consists of researchers Chanho, Naga, 0xStan, 0xMc, and Paco with additional support from Xenophon Labs.
  • Responsibilities: Curve Research identifies and focuses on high-impact quantitative initiatives throughout the Curve ecosystem. In addition to providing the Curvesim simulation tool to ease analysis and integration with Curve, the research team liaisons with multiple Curve ecosystem participants to help configure Curve products and resolve quantitative issues arising from unexpected market events. Finally, Curve Research aims to improve users’ understanding and usage of Curve products by publishing user guides, explainers, and market-relevant analyses.
    • Develop and maintain the Curvesim simulation package
    • Perform simulations and risk assessments of parameter change proposals
    • Liaison with other protocols to optimize parameters for new and already-existing pools
    • Collaborate with Llama Risk, Curve Analytics, and third-party research teams on quantitative aspects of their respective work
    • Publish practical guides and in-depth explainers of Curve products, as well as quantitative analyses of developments in the Curve ecosystem

Curve Risk

  • Budget: 5m CRV vested over 365 days for operations from Q1 '24 to Q1 '26.
  • 3-of-6 multisig: 0xa2482aA1376BEcCBA98B17578B17EcE82E6D9E86
    • Wormhole - Head Llama Herder
    • Knows - Llama Risk Advisor
    • Naga - Curve Researcher
    • Chanho - Curve Researcher
    • Fiddy - Curve Team
    • Amadeo - Grants Council Member
  • Team: Llama Risk currently consists of managers Wormhole, Knows, and Fiddy, technical lead Marin, legal counsel Svetlin, and our Llama Risk analyst team.
  • Responsibilities: Llama Risk conducts risk assessments and analysis relevant to Curve and its LPs. It began its operations in Q4 '21 as a community initiative and has been operating as a DAO-funded nonprofit ever since. It typically reviews stablecoin, RWA, and LST protocols that have Curve integrations and has recently begun assessing existing and prospective collateral types for crvUSD. In addition to its own in-house assessments, it works with third-party risk and analytics teams such as Xenophon Labs and Chaos Labs to provide relevant risk-related services to Curve. It has also recently begun work in regulatory affairs to help regulators understand the state of DeFi and the projects building in it.
    • Investigate and publish risk assessments relevant to Curve DAO, LPs, and crvUSD users
    • Point of contact with protocol teams integrating with Curve
    • DAO housekeeping- monitor the state of gauges and DAO votes for issues requiring action
    • Regulatory Affairs- outreach with regulators and web3 working groups
    • Fund risk analysis teams to provide dashboards/analytics for Curve users

Curve Analytics

  • Budget: 5m CRV vested over 365 days for operations from Q1 '24 to Q1 '26.
  • 2-of-4 multisig: 0x6711ADA98ac2d602E99aCD8C12013dfaA4FA07C2
    • Benny - Curve Monitor Lead
    • Alunara - Curve Monitor front end
    • Phillip - Curve Monitor back end
    • Tommy - Votium
  • Team: Curve Analytics currently consists of developers Benny, Alunara, and Phillip.
  • Responsibilities: The Analytics team was established in Q2 '23 with the objective of providing open, transparent, and reliable data streams encompassing all aspects of the Curve ecosystem. Our work includes the development of an analytics platform Curve Monitor, which offers real-time dashboards featuring pool metrics, MEV monitoring, revenue tracking, and information on crvUSD rates and markets. Additionally, we are responsible for developing and maintaining back-end services that are used by Curve’s official front-end, Curve subDAOs, and third-party protocols working within the Curve ecosystem. We also maintain bots on messaging apps that provide real-time tracking of user activity and MEV on Curve.
    • Develop and maintain user-facing analytics services through Curve Monitor and messaging app bots.
    • Develop and maintain back-end API services (such as curve-prices API, Llama Airforce API, and subgraphs), ensuring their reliability and performance while providing detailed, up-to-date documentation for each.
    • Collaborate with the Curve core team, Curve subDAOs, third-party protocols, and the wider Curve community to ascertain existing and upcoming data requirements and gather feedback for potential improvements to Curve Monitor and other analytics services.
    • Manage multiple independent analytics teams to provide useful and accurate analytics for Curve.
    • Conduct regular reviews and audits of the data to ensure accuracy.
    • Monitor inaccurate Curve-related metrics on other platforms and liaise with said platforms to provide corrections when needed.
    • Use data to provide insights and reports on MEV, gas usage, user behavior, etc. to the core team and DAO.
    • Maintain an open codebase and onboard new analysts and contributors

Dev Tools

  • Budget: 10m CRV vested over 365 days for operations from Q1 '24 to Q1 '26
  • 3-of-6 multisig: 0x637351b0a32bC7bb7F6A19686a76D84233710Ad9
    • Fiddy - Curve Dev Tools Lead
    • Charles - Vyper + Titanoboa Lead
    • Fubuloubu - Vyper, Yearn Dev, and ApeWorx Founder
    • Wavey - Yearn Dev
    • Pascal - Vyper (Snekmate) Dev
    • Wormhole - Dev Tools Advisor
  • Team: Dev Tools will be a newly formed group composed of developers working within the Curve and Vyper ecosystem.
  • Responsibilities: The Dev Tools group will be responsible for building and maintaining essential tooling for Curve including Vyper, ApeWorx, and others. The group will identify the most significant needs and manage the allocation of funds toward creating and maintaining such tools. Its priority is to ensure Vyper is adequately funded and supervises its development, as the programming language and its associated tooling is a core technology underpinning Curve. Currently, funds are planned to be used for the following endeavors:
    • Fund development and maintenance of the Vyper language and associated Titanoboa interpreter, including bugfixes, maintenance, features, and performance improvements
      • Ongoing, regular audits of the Vyper compiler from multiple tier 1 audit firms (tentatively: ChainSecurity, Statemind, Ottersec, and Certora)
      • Funding support from FV tools and static analyzers, including Certora, Slither, Halmos, Mythril, and HEVM
      • Regular audit/review competitions from Codehawks, Sherlock, and Code4rena
      • Bug bounty programs administered through Immunefi
    • Otherwise allocating funds toward developers, audits, and bug bounty programs as needed
    • Supervise the progress of teams receiving funding
    • Coordinate with teams and people building tooling for Curve
    • Monitor for future dev tooling needs and proactively explore suitability for Curve
    • Allocate funds toward developers, audits, and bug bounty programs as needed

I see the value of allowing for greater autonomy in this way - while still maintaining accountability via publicly shared details of operations every quarter (at least).

Thank you all for continuing to keep Curve healthy. I will vote in favor of this proposal.


I am glad the Risk Team is exploring this important issue. Are there some soft deliverables that you could share with us or some short term or longer term achievable goals?

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I think it would make much more sense to have those multisig holding the tokens but paying researchers on a task by task basis. I don’t think the vesting format makes sense. It will not motivate recipient to further innovate.

Also, most of the tasks covered were already subject to grants, are those gonna stop?

These figures seem notably high when considering projects with large teams actively contributing value to the space. Is it indeed around 800k - 1M CRV / year for those participating in subDAOs? Is there a clear reasoning behind these yearly amounts? Perhaps it would be more practical to set a foundational quarterly amount, adjusting it based on market conditions and performance metrics :pray:t2:


Two subdaos should be more than enough. Risk, Research and Analytics should be bundled in one package RRA.

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The recipients won’t be getting vesting tokens. The vesting is for the msigs.

There hasn’t been much grants issued under the current format. So yes the ones under scope of a subdao will then go to the subdao, but that’s actually better, as they are more likely to be reviewed in a timely fashion. Right now it is often @WormholeOracle doing that.


Ok, thanks for clarifying!
So once a token vests to a certain subdao’s multisig, how does it get given to the sub dao team?

Thanks for the feedback, Julien.

To clarify, the amount requested would cover both salary for the team and costs for subcontractors to do specific tasks. So no one would be getting paid 1m CRV.

For example, research is planning to subcontract with Xenophon labs, who have done good work with us in the past, and a few others. The overall budget request is based on estimated costs for those.

I agree volatility makes budgeting difficult. Eg, in a raging bull market, these numbers could become too high. In that case, I personally expect we would return excess funds to the DAO, although it might be nice to harden this mechanism somehow.


Regarding regulatory matters, we have hired legal counsel (Svetlin) this year who has been invaluable in our dealings with custodial stablecoin and RWA issuers. We see interesting developments with tokenized U.S. debt obligations that can pose significant opportunities for Curve. We want to foster those relationships with issuers/service providers of RWAs such as Ondo and Matrixdock. OTOH there are unique and stringent regulatory hurdles that make the adoption of tokenized securities challenging, so we seek to better understand these assets so that we can represent the DAO’s interests in industry focus groups (such as the recently formed Tokenized Asset Coalition) and with regulators directly. In the short term, we have been talking to CAC organizers and are planning to present at the conference in Frankfurt this October which has a heavy TradFi/regulator presence. This is an opportunity for us to bridge the gap between TradFi and DeFi which we believe will be important for the long-term success of Curve. Svetlin is in charge of reg affairs so perhaps he could elaborate more on this topic.


Thank you for this clarification. This is great. I am glad the Team is tackling this head on.

Thanks for pointing this out, this is something that I didn’t state clearly enough and I’ve seen several people confused by the proposed budgeting. The members listed on the multisig/team in the proposal are not personally entitled to the vested CRV. The individual team members have agreements within their subDAO what kind of compensation they receive, which in every case is much less than the CRV vested to each subDAO. Primarily, the subDAO is responsible for budget allocations to other teams and individuals working within the discipline and to help coordinate the efforts of the contributors. The idea is to manage an extended network of teams working on Curve, not to enrich a few core team members.

Also, as stated in the proposal, subDAOs agree to return any unused funds after 2 years unless there is explicit approval from the DAO to continue operations. The vested CRV is a theoretical ceiling.

Also, continued accountability to the DAO is a priority, with the expectation that subDAOs provide regular public updates:


Should remember this is preallocated funds. It’ll sit idle either in grant council or at subdaos (if no work is done). I for one would be happy if it was sitting in active msigs instead of idle grant council.

imo, quarterly forecasting would be cool if this was a well functioning mechanism already. But for now, the issue is oversight as a method is not working as intended. Curve needs to distribute autonomy (subdaos) and authority (funds/voteweight) to to smoller groups in order to kickstart further development on cutting edges of the protocol once and for all. More oversight will not allow that.(its proven that it did not) Lets start from there for the health of what this convo seeks to achieve.

That being said, understand that it looks like a lot. Maybe we can put a pin on a point in time/price and determine an evaluation method to execute when that happens. The proposal leaves room for CurveDAO to do exactly that whenever it wishes to. I for one would be happy to hold these people accountable after giving them autonomy and authority. (and see the DAO more active all together)

Edit: Another method could be lowering the amounts but having the funds fully vested to begin with, which would give more room to grow.

Disclaimer: i have nothing to gain from this proposal, dont belong to any of the subdaos or have potential skills to offer either.

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You are right to raise these concerns and we should have done a better job addressing them in the proposal. As others have pointed out, the amounts are not salaries and are not necessarily intended to be spent in full: excess amounts at the end of the 2 year period would be returned to the DAO or rolled over. We are more than open to having more people on the multisig or discuss alternative vesting solutions to ensure that this is enforced.

For analytics, our current grant pays for one full-time developer’s salary at $100k/year (pre-tax, no benefits), infrastructure costs (hosting, RPC providers, gas money) and a subcontractor. This new grant would allow us to continue to cover our current expenses as well as fund new contributors. We’ve worked with external contributors (Chaos Labs, IntoTheBlock) and the grant would streamline the payment process for similar future engagements by having our team manage it rather than the grant council. The grant council already have to review a large (and increasing) number of proposals in very different domains, this would take work off of their plate, allow finer-grained scrutiny of proposals (for instance ensure we’re not funding the same analytics tools 5 times under different packages) and faster turnover.

While I understand the rationale for having quarterly grants or a lower timeframe on the payment and making the overall grant amount smaller, I don’t think this is practical. Each of the subDAOs have or will have full-time contributors who rely on their salary to pay rent and meet their other real life expenses. We can’t tell them that they’re not getting paid just yet because there’s no quorum on the vote for the top up proposal and we’ll have to resubmit. Or that they’ll have to take a temporary pay cut because CRV is down 50% and the quarterly grant now doesn’t have a buffer to cover their salary in full until the next top up from the community fund. This does not mean that there’s no accountability of course, the proposal calls for quarterly activity reports and the subDAOs could have more direct oversight from the current grant council via multisigs.


@solace I deeply appreciate the recognition of the importance of forging closer ties with regulators, especially at a time when legislation around burgeoning technologies is under active deliberation. Engaging proactively with regulators not only facilitates a more informed legislative process but also ensures that the regulations that emerge are beneficial and balanced for the entire industry.

In pursuit of this objective, we diligently provide feedback through public consultations, drive open discourse, and in near future aim to even host dedicated DeFi workshops. Through my active association with LexDAO and the Blockchain Lawyers Group we get a direct vantage point into the unfolding legislative developments. Moreover, it ensures our connectivity to a comprehensive network of regional experts and facilitates qualified liaisons with relevant authorities.

Below you may find an overview of our recent activities besides the initiatives mentioned by @WormholeOracle :

  • Contribute to the joint response to the French AMF Discussion Paper on DeFi, in alliance with esteemed entities like IOTA, INATBA, and the EU Blockchain Association due at 30 September 2023;
  • Draft a considered response to EBA consults on draft technical standards on EU market access of issuers of asset-referenced tokens under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation due at 12 October 2023;
  • Imminent participation at the exclusive MiCA conference in Malta. Organized by MFSA, this event promises enriching interactions with preeminent regional and international regulators.
  • Active dialogues are underway with the European Crypto Initiative and Blockchain4Europe. Our collaborative intent revolves around hosting a comprehensive digital assets risk assessment workshop and providing specialized risk consultancy for member bodies and regulatory authorities.

I am happy to answer more questions on this matter or discuss ideas for future outreach.


Thanks for the subDAOs proposal. I would support this.

However I would like to have more on the deliverables and the timeline for each DAOs. It’s critical for curvies to assess the work produced in an objective way. Would it be possible for each SubDAOs to produce a deliverable roadmap on 3 topics of their own choosing?

thanks, ben

I like the idea of funding this work, the subdao concept, but I’m not inclined to pay in flat $crv. Payment in dollar denomination, salaries using $crv, but such that it’s more akin to a employment relationship. We can add more incentives, bonus, benefits etc as agreed upon by other stakeholders.

Separate votes for each subdao, not an aggregate approval of all.
Votes on the work to be done, granularly.
Votes on salaries, dollar denominated, based on role.
Votes on benefits by meeting productivity targets.

Hi everybody, longtime reader, first time writer.

This proposal has sparked several suggestions for how to require more accountability from grant seekers, in the interest of protecting the broader Curve community. This is, of course, an uncontroversial goal we all share.

At the moment, though, these are solutions in search of problems. We have plenty of checks and balances built into this system, including considerations built into the current proposal. Such safeguards are clearly working, as evidenced by the current slate of grant recipients – they’re all talented professionals delivering above and beyond for Curve.

In fact, I perceive the opposite concern. Our current system appears more cumbersome than protective. The present bureaucratic maze is becoming an undue burden which has had the effect of scaring off new contributors from even applying, rather than rooting out bad apples. We’re fortunate that such top-tier individuals have chosen to associate with Curve, especially when they have to endure the undignified act of publicly seeking signatures for relatively uncompetitive compensation. It’s far better to properly reward A-plus talent than to leave funds sitting idle.

Great developers should have the freedom to concentrate on their work without the added burden of politicking quarterly for their pay. Considering the choice between a stable tech role with assured pay and benefits, and the unpredictable nature of DAO funding in a bear market, it’s truly a testament to the vision of Curve’s founders that we’ve been so successful at attracting and retaining such a remarkable team. They shouldn’t be made to dance for their dinner.

It’s essential to establish a system where skilled contributors can center their energy on productive tasks.
This proposal is commendable because well-structured SubDAOs may be capable of navigating bureaucratic hurdles on contributor’s behalf. The proposed members of the SubDAOs all appear to have earned the community’s trust, and we’d feel comfortable deputizing them to manage both teams and budgets for Curve’s success unless proven otherwise. That said, we should properly debate to ensure the composition of all teams are balanced among concerns from vested interests.

That said, the most important principle is that top-tier players with a proven track record should no longer be required to constantly seek approval for their remuneration. The status quo falls short of this, and I welcome critiques of this proposal that offer alternatives that effectively address this concern.

I write this as someone who doesn’t receive funding from the grants committee, voicing concerns that such colleagues might be more hesitant to share.


That’s what grants are. This line of thinking makes no sense. They are LITERALLY “politicking” for pay right now with this proposal and will need to politick again to start up a new stream.

Things may be faster/more focused but that doesn’t change the fact these are grants and you have to keep asking for grants


Vote seems to be already up

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