Proposal to Fund Several Curve SubDAOs from the Community Fund

I think this this is a good proposal and curve can be very happy to be able to attract so many good people.

I just want to highlight that if legal entity gets vested token this may be tax wise a problem. I had this experience myself in my swiss LTD as I worked for token.

If the price is going down, you have to book a booking loss and on the book shows you are broke. In my country you then would have to top your capital up to be liquid.

If the price is going up, you book at gain on the books and would have to pay taxes on this.

Only way to deal with this is to sell token at the time you get them.

Ofc there are other legal entities which may not have this problems, maybe @svetlink can sheed some light on this.

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The idea is to delegat this to the multisig holders. I don’t think the dao should manage at the level as you describe. From my experience with DAOs it creats bureaucracy/politics and distract builders from working.

Digital asset-related tax policies and requirements across the globe are very difficult to be thoroughly addressed in a single assessment. For instance Germany treats cryptocurrencies as private money or assets, subject to capital gains tax. France gives no tax exemption for holding cryptocurrencies for an extended period.

A new EU law, DAC8 will change the regional landscape with reporting requirements imposed on the VASPs. There will be certainly countries offering favorable conditions for crypto holders but they should further consider the rules of their country of citizenship/tax residence.

Thank you for your suggestion - it is valuable for adding an extra research vector (i.e. tax liabilities) to the projected legal incorporation manual.


The important difference would be the frequency of grant requests. Under this proposal, renewal would come every 2 years instead of annually/quarterly. Each renewal would roll 3 primary proposals (each subdao) and several subgrants into one. Finally, subDAOs could change their allocation plans (or even entirely replace subcontractors) without additional applications to the Grants Council.

So subDAO proposals are lumped together, applications to each subDAO are processed in parallel, and subDAOs are granted some autonomy to skip over reviews by the Grants Council.

So I think the efficiency gains are not really in question, but the trade-off is in granting the subDAOs some autonomy. There are some proposals here and elsewhere which would increase the DAO’s oversight over the subDAOs, which I think are welcome. Finally, a DAO vote every 2 years is more decentralized than several smaller Grants Council decisions. As suggested above, more detailed roadmaps may help there.

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If you wanted a longer grant then you could just negotiate your grant length. As someone with a good track record it wouldn’t have been a huge ask.

It’s not like current grants are tied to some duration rule.

This is a bit of a moot point.

Also each group should be reviewing their own grants and the dao should be reviewing the groups. So people still get reviewed.

There’s other advantages of splitting up here but just to be clear as it sounds like your applying an arbitrary rule from grant council that doesn’t exist

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The points above are not about the terms of our specific grant. The issue, as I see it, is about generating an efficient, robust system for funding ecosystem growth generally.

Currently, proposals often require informal manager/advocates to get pushed through, some work is paid for out-of-pocket by core contributors, and the Grant Council has only spent a fraction of its funds. That suggests that some processes need to be adjusted/augmented, and this proposal is an effort to do so based on the experiences of several continuing contributors.

To be clear, this is not a dig on the Grants Council, but just reflects the fact that funding goals/roles/operations probably need to be fleshed out more explicitly and may need larger dedicated teams to operate smoothly.


I know Mich has but I’m unaware of any that were actually proposed and denied or anything.

Please don’t frame this as a bad thing. I would be upset if the council spent all of its funds already.

I’m in favor in the spirit of things just need to work out details a bit more.

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The problem here is that the entire proposal treats CRV as if it were a monetary value, when it should be regarded as the value of a governance token and what you can achieve by locking CRV into projects like the liquid lockers (StakeDAO). In the end, it’s not about how many dollars someone could receive from a subDAO for their work, but rather about what can be unlocked from having millions of CRV locked in such a position.


Agree with both viewpoints, but right now it seems like a bad time for Curve to give out such large grants. Maybe could start with 1/10 of the proposed amount.


large grants are generally not a good starting point but increasing the grant requests over time based on successful achievement usually work out best for all involved.