Alchemix is requesting feedback on this draft proposal, in the context of the alETH/ETH pool exploit. It is anticipated affected LPers of the July Vyper exploit will be receiving recompensation in the form of 1-year vested CRV tokens. Alchemix is requesting to instead receive these tokens up front, as well as a veCRV whitelist for its treasury, provided all recompensation CRV is max-locked in a mix of veCRV and sdCRV. Alchemix is strongly aligned and dependent on Curve as the home of liquidity for alETH and alUSD and their respective AMOs. Alchemix is further aligned through its significant holdings of CVX and sdCRV.
Alchemix is requesting a veCRV whitelist for its multisig treasury, 0x9e2b6378ee8ad2a4a95fe481d63caba8fb0ebbf9, and is requesting to receive the expected CRV recompensation for the Vyper exploit up front, with the stipulation it is max-locked in a mix of veCRV and sdCRV.
It is the understanding of the Alchemix team that Curve intends to refund LPers through a 1 year vest of CRV because the necessary amount of CRV to refund LPers of all affected pools cannot be released in liquid form. Alchemix is proposing to receive the entire refund up front, with the stipulation that it is locked in a mixture of sdCRV and max-locked veCRV.
The benefit to Curve DAO is that CRV allocated to Alchemix would be unable to enter circulation for at least 4 years, if ever. Additionally, creating a minimum 4-year locked position instead of vested CRV incentivizes Alchemix to continue to incentivize alAsset liquidity on Curve - an alignment Alchemix is happy to continue.
The benefit to Alchemix is the flexibility of the veCRV whitelist in that Alchemix does not have to rely fully on liquid lockers. Additionally, this allows Alchemix to reback alETH swiftly by selling portions of the current CVX and sdCRV positions in the treasury, without zeroing out its voting power for a significant period of time (which would reduce alignment).
It is understood by Alchemix that Curve wishes to make exploit-affected LPers whole, and due to the size of the necessary funds, the funds cannot be distributed as liquid/unlocked CRV. Alchemix is requesting flexibility in how the CRV is used (the same flexibility we would have if it were possible to refund LPers up-front), so long as it meets the primary goal of Curve DAO that the funds are limited in their ability to circulate. This proposal requests that flexibility in return for greatly decreasing the chance that these tokens ever enter the circulating supply.
The precedent here is JPEG’d whitelist request. veCRV whitelist request for JPEG'd DAO. The only difference is that Alchemix would lock in sdCRV and veCRV, instead of only veCRV, but the net result - the entire refund being locked for 4+ years - is the same.
Specification (Note: Proposal is currently a request for comment).
Whitelist veCRV lockup for the Alchemix treasury 0x9e2b6378ee8ad2a4a95fe481d63caba8fb0ebbf9
Grants council to send the Alchemix AMO portion of CRV recompensation to a Curve DAO-controlled wallet. There will then be an on chain vote to disperse this CRV to the Alchemix multisig treasury wallet. The received CRV would all be max-locked in veCRV and sdCRV by Alchemix.
FAQ - Is Alchemix launching a wrapped veCRV derivative?:
No. Alchemix has considered alCRV or alCVX in the past, but these are infeasible with the current codebase/economic model and would also require whitelisting of a separate contract specifically for alCRV if it ever were pursued.
The benefit to Curve is that the portion of CRV used to compensate Alchemix will be out of circulation for at least 4 years, instead of vested over the course of 1 year. For Alchemix, dependency on liquid lockers is reduced and alETH can be rebacked in much less than 1 year without decimating Alchemix’s Curve voting power, which maintains Alchemix’s alignment with Curve.
Alchemix is requesting special treatment as an affected LPer of the July Vyper exploit.
- (temp check) FOR
- (temp check) AGAINST