I have read various proposals written by @andre.cronje, but every time I read his articles (including twitter) I feel like something broken. His yearn finance is basically leveraging curve finance to earn incentives (CRV), which is basically higher level of dApp in DeFi ecosystem.
I acknowledge his contribution to this community because yearn finance for sure motivated to massive participation to the curve pool. And I also agree with their opportunity to boost their shares using veCRV tokens.
However, I am wondering if our governance is wise enough to reflect the voting power of yearn finance. There is two major problem I believe.
The major goal of yearn finance is to earn incentives from selling CRV. This community is basically no willing to hold CRV in the long them. It also means they might be free from the price of CRV. The soul of DAO is solely relied on a naive assumption: one with massive voting power would act wisely to increase the value of his share. This assumption does not work for this case.
Even if the yVault people wants to develop curve community, another problem still stands. Who will have this massive voting right that comes from the vault? If it works as DAO, whenever we have formal CIP proposals, they should vote for agree/reject. Is it working in that way? Or just delegated to voting power to one celebrity? If so, it should be fixed as we have already seen fails in DPOS protocols. Their governance is not working as they expected.
In summary, my suggestion is to split veCRV into common share and preferred share. I don’t believe veCRV owned by Vault works as desired. Thus, I would recommend to remove the voting right from the Vault. As their initial goal is to maximize their incomes, we acknowledge this motivation by giving them as like preferred share in stock market.