Proposal to add sdTokens tokens pools to the gauge controller

Can you fix the links in the “audits” section?

4 Likes

Hi, i don’t know why i can no longer edit the proposal.
Below are the fixed audits links:
FXS locker audit: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/Qmf6y8tX3CuZgDFkE3BUoxSSE2PsCG5N8zGNHejbyVkqwf
ANGLE locker audit + veSDT contract: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmeFv7ZHqXnHuRiPm7k7JfUYn4XhzYTbAydavNfHqMLPLa
Answer from Stake DAO yet to be reviewed: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmUJG4ezFMP6faqT7UKxzTp1cWDLxTb8J6uKznEwK7zyX1

11 Likes

This is NOT a good idea and I would encourage the protocol to vote against this proposal. This would fracture liquidity away from the Convex Platform’s cvxCRV + fxsFXS liquidity tokens.

StakeDAO has a whitelist so they have the right to lock and issue liquidity tokens themselves. However, it is clear to me that StakeDAO does not care about the value to their token holders…they care about the value of their token holder’s locked curve for voting power. These two are not the same. StakeDao’s liquidity token lost the race for yield and adoption last year. This proposal would allow bypassing of the white list potentially opening the protocol up to bad actors.

Lastly, I think that allowing incentivization of another liquidity token would be disingenuous to noob defi users as it would cause confusion in the space since they would not understand that not all liquidity tokens are the same or that StakeDAO has a bad reputation for token value.

16 Likes

Very excited about this proposal, full support !
Looking forward to see the liquid lockers thrive

5 Likes

-1 from me; Actually I am super against this proposal. The whitelist is there for a reason, opening the door to rogue governance.

9 Likes

I do not agree with this proposal and would vote against it. veCRV has been a strength of Curve and has allowed the program to make long term decisions. Changing the structure now after such incredible success seems reckless. Solid no vote from me.

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This is a Trojan horse. The main purpose of this proposal is to bypass the whitelist and open up a direct bribing service for Curve governance. Do not vote for this.

To the authors - Can you explain how you will protect against a flash loan attack where an entity could establish a massive amount of veCRV governance power and then immediately exit the position? The 4-year lock is to ensure that those with the most power are those most invested in the long-term success of Curve. Your proposal completely removes this incentive. Can you explain why you believe this incentive should no longer exist?

The outcome of this proposal would be to strip bare the protections on the so-called “Heart of DeFi” (StakeDAO’s words, not mine) and allow any big bad wolf to do as they please. This proposal is not good for Curve. Do not vote for it.

7 Likes

I am fully support StakeDAO proposal and going to vote For. Convex made a great job during last year, but now Convex looks like Trojan horse for Curve gov and a lot of players already “play” with “liquid veCRV” in form of CVX without whitelisting. We need more Trojan horses like Convex (CVX) and StakeDAO (liquid lockers) to make Curve stronger. We are should vote for benefit future of Curve not just Convex share.

18 Likes

Hey 0xLeibniz
Pretty easy to avoid flashloan governance attacks: just need to take a snapshot date which is in the past compared to the transaction pushed on snapshot. This is already what we do: the snapshot block is the same as on Curve so that people can’t have double vote and can’t use MEV to flashloan attack the governance.

10 Likes

This is a great proposal for Curve as it provides another offering to maintain the value of veCRV as against the current model where the utility of the Curve token is stripped away and abstracted into the Convex token in exchange for higher deposits to Curve. Though beneficial to scale Curve to an extend more recently we’ve seen that DAOs and individuals alike see the only option to go on Convex, dump CRV rewards for CVX or scale into cvxCRV growing the power of CVX and so on…

As a result there is a centralisation of Curve, through excellence in execution, we’re already at a point where Convex control Curve in totality. It’s irresponsible for us to think the centralisation of Curve into a demi-dao is something to just accept and never question.

These pools offer an alternative to Convex, reducing the % of relative voting power and will hopefully help to decentralise Curve rather than maintain the monopoly. The permissionless aspect is maintained since no power is abstracted away from the Curve token into another token printed at will with a team allocation. Therefore, we are in a situation where Curve governance is controlled by users with aligned incentives and we do not end up in a situation where a team can mint themselves an allocation (deserved or not) that gives them huge control over curve through abstracting away governance power from user Curve deposits into the pockets of the team.

Ultimately Convex designed a great flywheel that helped to scale Curve but Curve is big enough now that it does not need “helpers” and secondly the “helper” is now bigger than the DAO itself which threatens the existence of the DAO itself.

The status quo where Curve, Curve governance, and the Curve token are all second to Convex is net negative for the ecosystem. Let it be clear it is not convex itself that is bad but rather the monopoly Convex has over Curve that is now a danger to Curve itself. Anyone that has studied high-school econ knows monopolies are to the detriment of innovation, user value and the ecosystem as a whole for the benefit of a select few in power.

The narrative should not be Convex vs Stake DAO but rather focus on ensuring the success of Curve to prevent it’s centralisation and maintain an infrastructure that can scale to the size of something like the “tradi” Forex market. It is not possible to see this future come to light in a world where Curve as a service provider is open to all but Curve as a DAO is controlled in totality by another entity.

Stake DAO has been one of the first and strongest proponents of Curve and has endlessly supported the Curve ecosystem, this view is not one that will change. Curve is the central pillar of DeFi and by providing an alternative to Convex that maintains the power of veCRV rather than abstracting power away from it into another token whilst reducing monopoly power can only be a good thing.

30 Likes

The opposition to this proposal seems very tribal and somewhat blinded to the increased demand this will bring to Curve.
I shall be supporting this proposal

14 Likes

sounds like a logical further step to further decentralized VeCRV

have yet to see a good argument against this proposal, just noise

voting in favor of this proposal

7 Likes

StakeDAO aims to make governance on CRV fully liquid. It would open Curve up to more short term stakeholders. I’m sorry, but that’s a terrible idea. Why not put in a lock for governance votes?

I’m voting no.

4 Likes

We can put a lock for governance votes, but this is a proposal for the gauge, let’s not mix things up. We want to make things as protocol friendly as possible, the idea is really to help Curve here. Currently, CRV gets dumped massively because of this whitelist issue that was already flagged by the team.

8 Likes

I don’t get the arguments against the proposal:

  • the risk for flash loans attacks is mitigated by snapshots + it would work exactly the same for someone buying CVX.
  • “it would fracture liquidity away from the Convex Platform’s cvxCRV + fxsFXS liquidity tokens” is exactly why this proposal is interesting: it brings competition to Convex: any monopolistic situation should be avoided.
  • “StakeDAO aims to make governance on CRV fully liquid”: it’s a locker, so any CRV deposited there is locked forever, so it’s exactly like CVXCRV / CRV. Even if in a second time the sdCRV / CRV trade is made possible, the overall number of CRV locked should increase, which benefits Curve.
16 Likes

I am totally for this proposal !

I think that @Hatashi and @picodes have responded very well (I invite you to read their messages twice! :smiley: ), so I have nothing else to add and like @Dydymoon said: “The liquid lockers are a very interesting feature for every veToken holders”.

10 Likes

Can everyone just stop the team X vs Y stuff?
It’s not needed here and not helping the conversation.

The main problem people are seeing is that there seems to be 0 lock time on these curve governance controlling tokens. So it’s taking a 4 year lock up and reducing it to 0 (or a few days if you want to participate in a proposal).

For reference Convex is 4 months, which is a lot shorter than 4 years. Mich from curve actually gave me a hard time for this because it’s so much shorter. Some of this was alleviated because we can veto an obvious attack. But even then 4 months was/is considered short.

Thus all that needs to be done here is add a timelock in some manner. there can be different ways to go about it. The simplest of course just a timelock on withdraw once you stake etc.

I dont think most people would have much of a problem after that.

So it’s simple really. Just put a time lock on the staked tokens. end of story.

21 Likes

Seems like a good way forward

4 Likes

sdCRV (sdFXS, sdAngle) holder need to lock SDT (veSDT) token for up 4 years to use full potential of LL tokens voting power. The max benefit will have sdCRV+veSDT (4 years lock) owners. This already implemented. IMO this a protection layer like 16 weeks lock in vlCVX case

6 Likes

Very interesting, what do you think of the fact that the rewards generated by CVX are in CRV, and thus a selling pressure on CRV → less valued rewards → less valued on CVX, and thus may let us think that CRV need a buy pressure regarding the interest of CVX (so veCRV not strictly stripped away and abstracted into CVX) ?
Curve community needs to think of those financial dyanmics cause i agree they may be a risk of centralization, questionning the interest of the 50% - epsillon CRV token when a DAO on top of CRV hold the 50 + epsillon )…

5 Likes