CIP#23 - Gauge to allocate daily new CRV to veCRV holders

That’s just not how this works. People (well… investors) buy assets today based on their expected value in the future. If something is worth $3 in the future, you would apply an appropriate discount rate to get to the proper value today.

I won’t be selling any CRV at $0.01, unless it’s a completely dead project, which I don’t anticipate happening.

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This is a valid argument. I personally agree that we should wait for CIP#14 and CIP#18 first. However, it is good to have this proposal in place and ready to be implemented when the governance wants it.

“CRV inflation should belong to people putting capital at risk to keep the protocol running.”

veCRV holders are also putting their capital at risk by locking up CRV. In fact, their capital-at-risk is much more than LPs because they are the ones that is most affected by the price of CRV. They should be rewarded the most because they are putting where their mouth is - by holding and locking up CRV tokens.

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“veCRV giving themselves more CRV for free would be a bad look”

Stock dividends are given to existing holders, not outside parties. If there are 100m tokens in circulation and you minted another 100m tokens, what are the ways to distribute these new tokens?

  1. Airdrop it to random people
  2. Distribute it to people who provide liquidity (who are also just likely to withdraw liquidity if the yield is low)
  3. Distribute it to existing token holders so that their % holding remains about the same. For example someone who own 10m tokens (10% of 100m total supply pre-minting) will give given 10m new tokens (10% of 200m new total supply)

A combination of 2 and 3 would be good, with 3 getting the most of the new inflation so that their holdings are not diluted.

Dividends are returning a share of the profits to investors, which is pretty much exactly what the trade fees to veCRV are.

I don’t know what is really analogous to CRV inflation in traditional finance, but I think of it more as Curve’s way of compensating people who have done some service that helps it grow and thrive. Since the compensation is ownership stake, it causes service providers to naturally merge into stakeholders. Which is how it should be- the people making Curve work properly should be getting the privilege of an ownership stake.

Now, you are proposing that owners get to expand their stake without having to do anything extra for it, which I’d say is greedy, doesn’t create value, and isn’t fair to people who make Curve successful.

If you were to rework this proposal so that there is some requirement expected of veCRV before they have a right to more CRV, that could be interesting. Say, veCRV earns CRV for voting. I don’t know whether that particular idea would work, but the general idea is you’re dangling some carrot to incentive some behavior that benefits Curve. It’s more interesting when you’re using CRV to make something happen that would maybe not have happened otherwise.

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I don’t understand why LPs call that proposal as greedy. Now it is very unbalanced game, it will be ended very soon when last idiot will buy your CRV profit. Why LPs think that they make more for platform just giveing liqudity in stablecoins and waiting profit, but all their profit make buyers of CRV and now they are in lose game because price always go down, because you sell us 750K CRV each day, because nothing motivate you to hold it. And in the end LPs just will understand that their APY profit is very low (because nobody will buy their CRV), will withdraw their deposits and will go to another platform. And who is greedy parasite of platform? What better - to get 80% of CRV with good price or 100% with low price? If you don’t up value for CRV holders everything will end very soon for that platform and CRV holders, and LPs just will go to another platform with better profit. For sure we have to see what will happen after cip-14 and cip-18, but I calculated that it won’t help a lot, because with your sell pressure about 750K CRV each day and 15K USD for buyback as admin fee fair price will be 15/750 = around 0,02$ - easy math…

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Diverting CRV to veCRV holders does nothing to alleviate the sell pressure since they can just as easily sell the minted CRV as LPs can. The token will be worth more when the protocol is worth more. Simple as that.

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For sure some will, but most will stake it for grow more - same deposit psychology as LP have now. And pressure of sell will go down - price will grow, more motivation to buy and hold, more liquidity to sell your CRV profit on market - easy logic, win-win game for LP and buyers\holders . More stakers - more decentral governance. Equilibrium paradise, but now it is a hell for buyers\holders and paradice only for LP on short term…

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Rubbish, LPs will also stake more if its worth it.
LPs are risking all their money, literally billions of dollars and deserve compesation.

veCRV holders that don’t provide liquidity have nearly no risk at all.

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Ok, nobody will buy your CRV profit and what for you will stay here? Buyers of CRV are risking no less , because they spend money to buy your CRV profit and it is not stablecoin…

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You are just distributing more CRV to the team and investors who also have a fuckton of veCRV, besides that all big veCRV holders are also liquidity providers…

This whole proposal does not make any sense, it’s just a gimmick and does not add any real value.

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Without demand offer on token price will be zero in near future, you will sell it to yourself? and finally you will go to another Defi with better APY, will see

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LPs made money from admin fees until you stole half of them already, the crv price is still way too expensive, fully dilluted mcap is nuts.

Uniswap worked fine without token, people used it for trading and earned fees… If u want the token to be worth more, drive more volume.

Oh come on, admin fee haha, 90% of profit you have done to sell your CRV each day to idiots until it will be zero. 10 000 USD now - it is 0,5 USD admin fee and 6 USD in CRV… You are not farsighted or you just do not care about the future of the platform and it is important to suck the profit while it is

I am so far sighted that i see these gimmicks to not have any effect.

If you want to get rid of a big chunk of supply you can just ask the team and investors to burn their billions of tokens instead

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I’m agree with cut of ended supply, but it could be done only with hardfork… and Mihail still don’t think about it… I think it can be easy to cut it to 5 times w\o any problem and proportionally to cut daily supply for everyone, and do it today more right, because not so much tokens have been supplyed and growing to 660 mln will be good enough. But token motivation to hold must be also done. That two problems must be in focus right now, because in some future will be too late

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You should vote Yes! This is a non-binding vote, so if most voters want it, we could explore deeper into this and work out the kinks. If most people don’t want it, then no point to further explore this option.

Interesting proposal but I think that LPs will most likely take their liquidity to another platform if we reduce the CRV LP rewards should veCRV holders vote for this gauge. I think that we should figure out how to incentivize LPs to lock CRV in order to get higher CRV rewards. Some thoughts from my end on how we can accomplish this:

  1. Currently, the boost ranges between 1%-2.5% for all gauges. Rather than having 1% be the bottom perhaps we can make this 0% and have the boost range be 0%-3.5%. Essentially what this means for LPs is that if they don’t have any veCRV then they won’t be able to get CRV LP rewards. They will only get APY from trading fees in the pools that they belong to unless they hold veCRV to get a boost percentage.

  2. Incentivize folks to not claim CRV rewards as often. I am not sure how we would implement this but an idea that I have is to reward folks that don’t claim CRV from the gauges as often. Essentially, if two LPs provide the same liquidity to the same pool and LP1 claims weekly while LP2 claims yearly then at the end of the year LP2 should end up with more CRV then LP1 who was claiming weekly. This is similar to what other saving platforms are doing where if you go with the flexible option then you can claim at anytime but your APY will be less than if you lock for 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, etc…

  3. Provide the option to claim a portion of your CRV as veCRV from the gauges. For example, if an LP makes 1000 CRV weekly then incentivize him to claim a portion of that as veCRV so that when the lock expires he gets back the amount of CRV that he locked plus an additional amount. In this scenario he might decide to claim 500 CRV every week and claim the other 500 CRV as veCRV with a 1 month lock. At the end of the month he should get the 500 CRV that he lock with an additional amount on top, call it 525 CRV for the sake of our example. If he decided to claim the 500 CRV as veCRV with a 2 month lock then he might get 550 CRV at the end of two months etc… The point is that the higher the time that you lock the CRV that you are claiming, the more CRV that you should get at the end.

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Would it not make sense to pay out the daily new CRV tokens that should go to veCRV, based on the ratio of total supply and locked CRV. The more veCRV of all circulating CRV, the less will be distributed to the veCRV. The less veCRV of all circulating CRV, the more goes to the veCRV holders. Thus, the risk for the veCRV holders would be distributed more fairly.

This might heavily penalize people who lock up their CRV tokens. What we want is to encourage more people to lock up CRV tokens - to give an additional reason for locking up CRV tokens:

  1. To get boost
  2. To get admin fee

With this proposal:

  1. To get CRV

If you make it more attractive to lock up CRV tokens, you reduce the selling pressure. With a lower selling pressure = higher price = higher APY for LPs. From a governance standpoint, more veCRV the better.

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